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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONFORMING USE
IN THE PROPERTY TO OPERATE A RETAIL GROCERY STORE AND SERVICE STATION.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT MAY CHANGE FROM ONE NONCONFORMING USE TO ANOTHER NONCONFORMING
USE WITHIN THE SAME CLASSIFICATION.
POINT III.
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONF'ORMING, COMMERCIAL USE IN THE PROPERTY.
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POINT IV.
SECTION 8-4-6 OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
ZONING ORDINANCES VIOLATES TIIE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

SUPPLEMENTAL STA'TEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent feels that the statement of facts
contained in the brief of appellants is not complete,
therefore respectfully submits the following in addition.
Although the exact date that the building upon
the property beeame vacant is not certain, there is
no dispute in the fact that the building was used
for a number of years as a general store, possibly
as late as 1955. (R. 26) It is also not disputed
that gasoline pump islands were constructed upon
the premises for gasoline pumps which islands can
be clearly seen in Exhibit P-3.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONFORMING USE
IN THE PROPERTY TO OPERATE A RETAIL GROCERY STORE AND SERVICE STATION.

The Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance itself
protects the nonconforming use of the property.
Section 8-4-11 of the Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance states,
"The nonconforming use of land existing
at the time this title became effective may be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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continued, provided that no such nonconforming use shall in any way be expanded or extended either on the same or adjoining property; and provided that if such nonconforming use of land, or any portion thereof, is
abando1~ed or changed for a period of one ( 1)
year or more any future use of such land shall
be in conformity with the provisions of this
ti tie."
Since the building on the premises burned in
September of 1960, it is respondent's position that
Section 8-4-6 of the Zoning Ordinance is not ~applic
able. Respondent is not seeking to occupy said building but contends that he has the right to construct
a nonconforming bt1ilding under Section 8-4-5 of
the ordinance which reads as follows:
"A nonconforming building or structure
occupied by a nonconforming use which is
damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, wind,
earthquake or other calamity or act of God,
or the public enemy may be restored ~and the
occupancy or use of such building, structure
or part thereof which existed at the time such
damage or destruction may be continued or
resumed, provided that such restoration is
started within a period of one year ( 1) and
is diligently prosecuted to completion."
Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance reads as follows :
"A building or structure or portion thereof occupied by a nonconforming use, which is,
or hereafter becomes, vacant and remains
unoccupied by a nonconforming use for a
continuous period of one ( 1) year except for
dwelling, should not thereafter be occupied
3
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except by a use which confor1ns to the use
regulations of the zone in which it is located."
The words in the ordinance ''remains unoccupied", if applicable in the instant case, must mean
an abandonment as set forth in 8-4-11 of the ordinance which connotates something more than circumstances over which the owner has no control which
brings about a suspension of the use. Sections 8-4-6
and 8-4-11 of the ordinance must be construed together. The legal meaning of the word "Discontinue"
was construed in the case of State Ex. Rel. Schaetz
vs. Manders, 206 Wis. 121 238 NW 835 quoted in
114 ALR page 992,
"It was plainly the intent of the ordinance
to permit the continuance of nonconforming
uses. While we have found that no authority
construing the legal meaning of the "vord
"discontinue" we think that ·as used in this
ordinance it means something more than a
mere suspension. It was not the intention of
the ordinance to destroy the right of an owne1·
to continue the use of his premises by the mere
fact that his tenants became insolvent.
We agree with the circuit court that 'discontinue' as it is used in the ordinance cannot
mean a temporary nonoccupancy of the building or a temporary secession of the business.
The word 'discontinue' as it is used in the
ordinance is synonymous with 'abandonment'.
It connotates a voluntary, affirm·ative, completed act.
We thinl( that the rights secured to the
owner by the terms of the ordinance is not
4
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lost by either accident or unpropitious circun1stances over which he has no control, which
brings about a mere suspension of the nonconforming use. It is a right extended to him
and to be enjoyed by him until he voluntarily
1·elinquishes j t or abandons it.''
There is no proof that respondent or his predecessors in interest have abandoned or so changed
the use of the land so as to terminate the nonconforming use of the land.
To effect an abandonment of the nonconforming use of land, it is necessary to show ( 1 ) intent,
involving a voluntary change and actual relinquishment of right together with (2) some overt act
carrying the implication that the owner does not
claim or retain interest in the subject matter Landay
vs. McWilliams, 173 Md. 460 196 A 29'3, 114 ALR
984.

In Binghamton vs. Gartell, 275 APP Div 457
90 NYS
2d '556 is stated th'at an abandonment with,
in the meaning of the rule that the right of a property owner to continue a nonconforming use may
be lost through abandonment of such use connotates
a voluntary, affirmative, completed act and means
something more than a mere suspension, a temporary
non-occupancy of building or temporary ceasing of
business activities. (Also cited 18 ALR 2d- Zoning
- Resuming Nonconforming use 18 ALR 2d 725,
pages 730-731).
;_)
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Lapse of time is not, per se, decisive of whether
a nonconforming use has been abandoned, it being
merely one of the factors vvhich may evidence such
an intention. 18 ALR 2d page 7'25 at page 731.
The fact that respondent and his predecessors
in interest in the property continue to pay commercial taxes as assessed on the property indicates that
there was no intention to abandon the commercial
nonconforming use on the property (Exhibit P -1) .
In addition, the evidence showed that there was
during periods of nonoccupancy for rent and for sale
signs on the property. (R. 27) Periods of interruption of a nonconforming use due to the owner's inability to obtain a tenant or to sell the property does
not amount to an abandonment. In Haulenbeek vs.
Allanhurst, 1948 57 A 2d 5'2, 18 ALR 2d 747, it
appeared that ~at the time the zoning ordinance was
adopted and long before the building in question
was operated as a hotel, and was used in this capacity at least two years after the issuance of the
zoning ordinance under which the hotel constituted
the nonconforming use.
"For the following eleven years the history of the building was quite varied due to
the financial difficulties of the owner and his
inability to obtain a tenant. Thus the building
was empty for several years with interrupted
various efforts to operate it for the purpose
intended. For two years the building was occupied by the United States Army; and there6
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after the owner attempted to operate it again
as a hotel. I-Iolding that there was no ~abandon
ment or discontinuance of a non-conforming
use, so as to require a future use in compliance
with the zoning ordinance, the court stated
that the effort here had been to overcome the
difficulties of an economic depression and
wartime exigencies ~and that these acts could
not be considered such a substantial change
as to amount to an abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use."
18 ALR 2d 748 states:
"The fact that the nonconforming use
was suspended because of fin'ancial difficulties of the owner may negative an intention
on his part to abandon the nonconforming
use."
Temporary suspension of nonconforming use
does not amount to an abandonment because of the
seasonal ch'aracter of the work, or the lack of work,
because of reduced business activity, because of war
or other enforced nonuse such as a destruction, otherwise than by voluntary act of the owner of the premises. 18 ALR 2d 740, 849-50-51-52~53-54.
Zoning ordinances will be construed where possible to protect nonconforming uses; that is to say,
an ordinance en'acted pursuant to a zoning law will
be construed, if possible, as not effecting lawful
buildings, property rights, business and uses. McQuillan Municipal Corporations 3rd Edit. Revised,
Vol. 8, Section 25-184 page 475. Furthermore,
"Zoning ordinances, being in derogation
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of common law property rights will be strictly
construed and any ambiguity or uncertainty
decided in favor of property owners." Kubby
vs. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17 198 Pack 2d 134
page 138; City of Little Rock vs. Williams,
177 SW 2d 924; 440 East 1 02nd St. Corp. vs.
Murdock, 285 NY 298 34 NE 2d 329.
We must assume that Judge A. H. Ellett, trial
judge, made all necessary findings of fact essential
to support his ruling.
"Where findings of fact have not been
made the rule is that the judgment should be
affirmed if there is any theory of the case on
which such judgment can be sustained and any
reasonable evidence in the record supporting
such theory." Kubby vs. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17 198 Pac. 2d 134 page 137. Grizzle vs.
Runbeck, 244 Pac. 2d 1160 at page 1162.
It is submitted that in the instant case the tax
assessments and tax roll showing this property to
have been taxed as "Commercial-Industrial" as
shown in P-1 is sufficient evidence alone to sustain
the ruling of the trial court.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT MAY CHANGE FROM ONE NONCONFORMING USE TO ANOTHER NONCONFORMING
USE WITHIN THE SAME CLASSIFICATION.

Appellant states in its brief that if respondent
has a nonconforming use "that nonconforming right
is only to use the premises as a general store." Respondent contends that ·a nonconforming use for a
retail grocery store may be changed to a retail service
station.
8
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Section 8-1-6 of the ordinance contains the definitions of words and terms used therein, "Use", however, is nowhere defined.
The common law definition of the word "use" is
found in 58 Am. Jur. page 1021.
"A nonconforming use within the meaning of zoning regulations has been defined ~as
the use of the building or land that does not
agree with the use district to which it is situated."
It is and has been respondent's position that
Section 8-4-9 of the Zoning ordinance does not
prohibit different activities within the same nonconforming use; that is, nonconforming use having
a relation to classification. The nonconforming use
classification of the property in question is considered by respondent to be "nonconforming C-1".
This is the lightest commercial classification. "Nonconforming C-1" permits both retail gasoline stations and a.retail grocery store.
In the case of Nyberg vs. Solmson, 205 Md. 150
106 A 2d 483 46 ALR 2d, 1051, the owner of nonconforming property operated a new car ·agency
and subsequently the same property was used for
parking and storage of motor vehicles. Both were
nonconforming uses, however, both were permissible
in the first commercial use. The court held that it
was permissible to change from the one nonconforming use to the other and stated that "a nonconform9
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ing use m·ay be changed to a use of the same or higher
classification." (See also the annotation "Right to
Resume Nonconforming Use After Period of Nonuse or of a Different Use From That In Effect At or
Before the Time of Zoning.")
114 ALR 991.
"It may be stated generally that a mere
temporary discontinuance of 'a prior nonconforming use will not of itself show an abandonment thereof so as to preclude resumption
of such use."
POINT III.
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT
RE8PONDENT HAS A N'ONCONFORMING, COMMERCIAL USE IN THE PROPERTY.

Exhibit P-1 is the Salt Lake County Valuation
Notice on the subject property showing it to be
valued and assessed ·as "Commercial-Industrial";
and the same exhibit which is the assessment roll of
Salt Lake County further shows that the subject
property has been assessed as "Commercial-Industrial" for the past five ( 5) years.
The owner, Mr. Morrison, stated th'at before
he bought the property he checked the valuation
notices on the property and found it to be taxed as
commercial property. He further stated that this
commercial classification was one of the considerations which induced him to purchase the property.
( R. 19) . Trial court correctly observed ( R. 19) "I
am quite certain that a man buying property would
10
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pay more for it if it is commercial and on a corner
than he would if it was residential and on a corner.''
Anticipating respondent's reliance upon estoppel appellant has in Point No. 3 of its brief herein,
stated that since the zoning ordin·ance itself is constl'uctive notice of the zoning classification and
owner or prospective purchaser of a nonconforming
property cannot rely upon the assessment rolls as
indicia of a nonconforming right. It is submitted that
if taxp'ayers cannot rely on the official assessment
notices regarding use of property it would take a
judicial determination of every nonconforming operation to determine its status.
The county can 'be estop·ped even in governmental capacity where justice and equity require
(see pocket supplement 1'9 Am. Jur. Sec. 167 page
75), "and even in matters ~affecting its governmental
power, it may be sometimes estopped if equity and
justice demand it."
Farrell vs. Placer County, 14'5 Pac. 2d page
570 page 57.
It is the essence of justice that there should
not be two standards of conduct, one for the state
and its political subdivisions and the other for its
citizens. (See Semar vs. Fiskin, 210 Pac. 3'78 27
ALR 1208).
For Salt Lake County to assess and collect taxes
on this property in the heavier tax bracket of "Com11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mercial-Indsutrial'' and then refuse to permit the
activity for which it is taxed is unconscionable.
POINT IV.
SECTION 8-4-6 OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
ZONING ORDINANCES VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTA~H.

Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance reads as follows:
"A building or structure or portion thereof occupied by a nonconforming use, which is,
or hereafter becomes, vacant and remains unoccupied by a nonconforming use for a continuous period of one ( 1) year except for dwellings, shall not thereafter be occupied except
by a use which conforms to the use regulations of the zone in which it is located."
In the event Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance is
construed so that "vacant and remains unoccupied"
does not connotate an abandonment; that is not
requiring something affirmative on the owner's part
to show he voluntarily relinquishes his right, it is
respondent's contention that Section 8-4-6 standing
alone is unconstitutional and violates the due process
clause of the constitutions of the United States and
of the State of Utah, and further is the taking of
property without just compensation.
It is true that some courts have followed a rule
which permits a zoning statute to do away with
nonconforming uses after a statutory tolerance
period and cite, for authority, the case relied upon
12
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by appellant, Standard Oil Company vs. City of
Tallahassee, 5 Cir. 1950 183 F 2d 410, 412.
Most cases, however, are based on the police power
to terminate an obnoxious use,
"Most of the cases that follow the latter
rule do so on the grounds that the gradual
abatement of use found detrimental to the
health, morals, safety or general welfare is
a proper exercise of the police power."
Thompson on Real Property, 19'57, replacements, Vol. lOA Pocket Supplement, Section 53'58.
There h'as been no contention made by appellant at any time that respondent's use of the property for a retail grocery store and service station
is a nuisance or obnoxious in any sense or that it
would be detrimental in any way to health, morals,
safety, or general welfare. In Buchanan vs. Warley,
245 US 63 38 cases S. Ct. 60, 18 6'8 L. Ed. 149, the
Supreme Court of the United States asserted,
"Property is more than a mere thing
which a person owns; it is elementary that
it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property."
In Betty vs. City of Sidney, 79 Mont. 314 257
Pac. 1007, 1009 56 ALR 872, we find,
"The constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law may be violated without the physical taking of property for public
or private use. Property may be destroyed or
13
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its value may be ~annihilated; it is owned and
kept for some useful purpose and it has no
value unless it can be used. Its capability for
enjoyment and adaptability to some use are
essential characteristics 'and attributes without which property cannot be conceived. Hence
any law which destroys it or its value or takes
away any of its essential attributes deprives
the owner of his property.''
In Chicago B & Q Railway Company vs. State
of Illinois, 200 US 561 26 S. Ct. 341 350 50 L. Ed.
596 we find the following:
"The constitutional requirements of due
process of law which embraces compensation
for private property taken for public use applies in every case of the exertion of governmental power. If, in the execution of any
power, no matter what it is, the government,
Federal or State, finds it necessary to take
private property for public use it must obey
the constitutional injunction to m~ake or secure just compensation to the owner."
In City and County of Denver vs. Denver Buick,
Inc., 347 Pac. 2d, 919 at page 931 there is found
this significant quote,
"In ignoring or overlooking these basic
tenets the law has been reduced to a state of
contrarieties, where ownership envisions
rights in the law of property, but only privileges in the law of zoning and city planning."
If the ·appellants interpretation of Section 8-4-6
of the ordinance is correct, it means that an owner
14
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of a nonconforming use has no rights but only the
privilege to continue it, so long as it remains a profitable venture, so long as it is not destroyed by an
act of God, so long as there is no war or other circumstance which prevents him from operating. Property rights cannot be this fragile; the power of
government cannot be this arbitrary.
"There is another answer to the question
of what derives from ownership. It has been
tested in the crucible of time, and by reason
of its merit, constitutional provisions were
conceived and cast in its mold. By it an owner
has more than a conferable privilege to use
his property; he h~as a legal right, subject to
certain restraints to enjoy and use his property; his ownership and use springing therefrom are not privileges, but are rights which
this government was instituted to protect."
City and County of Denver vs. Denver Buick,
Inc., 34 7 Pac. 2d, 919 at page 931.
In Spann vs. City of Dallas, 235 SW 513, 515
1 9ALR 1387 it states,
"If the right of use be denied, the value
of the property is annihilated and ownership
is rendered a barren right."

City a1ul County of Denver vs. Denver Buick,
Inc., 347 P 2d 919, Page 932,
''Unless the further use of property imperils the safety, health, comfort or general
welfare of the community it appears that a
denial of such use would be invalid. And a
zoning restriction must have 'a reasonable and
substantial relation to the safety, health, mor15
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als or general welfare ; the connection may
not be tenuous, vague or remote."
CONCLUSION
Appellant having the burden to prove an abandonment of the nonconforming use cannot by mere
lapse of time sustain the burden required to show
an abandonment of nonconforming use. Under the
universal rule that all presumtions are in support
of the judgment; and where, as here, findings of
fact have not been made, the rule is that judgment
should be affirmed, if there is any reasonable evidence to support it.
In the event this court decides contrary to the
ruling of the trial court with respect to the operation of 'a retail gasoline station, respondent respectfully requests that the court declare that respondent
has a nonconforming use in the property for the
operation of a retail grocery store.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES E. FAUST
Attorney for Respondent
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Received a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent this ________________ day of ________________________________ ,
A.D., 19'61.

Attorney for Appellant
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

